(1)(b) of the CEA and is thus acting ultra vires because s/he is assuming powers which never conferred on him/her by the legislature. This paper also argues that the High Court in both matters, misconstrued the relationship between section 48(1)(b) and the "public interest" provisions in section 48 and thus unjustifiably stripped the Minister of Trade and Industry of his/her power to implement an amendment to Schedule 1. In the final analysis, this paper explores the impact of the Customs Duty Act 30 of 2014 on the Minister of Finance's powers in this regard.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to assess the scope of the powers of the Minister of Finance upon a request from the Minister of Trade and Industry to amend Schedule 1 to the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 (hereafter, CEA), in respect of imported goods as provided for by section 48 (1) (hereafter, Pioneer Foods) . 2 These two cases are particularly instructive in that they offer for the first time, clarification on the nature of the power conferred on the Minister of Finance by section 48(1)(b) of the CEA. This paper concludes by exploring the impact of the Customs Duty Act 30 of 2014 (hereafter, CDA) on the powers of the Minister of Finance in this regard. This enquiry is necessitated by the fact that the CDA and the Customs Control Act 31 of 2014 will collectively replace the provisions of the CEA in respect of custom duties at a date to be determined by the President. 3
The factual background
The dispute in South Africa Sugar Association v the Minister of Trade and Industry (hereafter, SASA) was precipitated by the Minister of Finance's decision to zero rate imported sugar, which meant that imported sugar was not subject to any import duty. 4 Unfortunately, this zero rating was based on outdated information and the result was that the sugar price used was almost US$ 200 higher than the 20-day average on the day the zero rating was gazetted. 5 The South Africa Sugar Association (hereafter, the Sugar Association) notified the International Trade Administration Commission (hereafter, ITAC) of its concerns in this regard, and consequently its representatives met with ITAC on 2 August 2017. 6 ITAC made a C VINTI PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 3 commitment that it would process the information provided to it by the Sugar Association within a day and submit a recommendation to the Minister of Trade and Industry. 7 On 3 August 2017 the Sugar Association sought a similar undertaking from the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Trade and Industry. 8 Subsequently the Minister of Trade and Industry provided the Sugar Association with the undertaking to consider and act on any recommendation relating to the import duty on sugar received from ITAC within five days of the receipt of the recommendation. 9 However, the Minister of Finance declined to give the Sugar Association a similar undertaking. 10 Consequently the Sugar Association then sought an order from the High Court directing the Minister of Finance to effect any "'consequential"' amendments to the Schedules to the CEA within five working days, or such other time as the court considered just, of having received the recommendation of the Minister of Trade and Industry. 11 In Pioneer Foods the applicant sought an order from the High Court compelling the Minister of Finance and the National Treasury to cause updated custom tariff duties on wheat imports to be published in the Government Gazette by no later than 8 September 2017 in terms of the CEA. 12 The applicant argued that since updated duties had already been determined by ITAC, which duties had been endorsed by the Minister of Trade and Industry, the Minister of Finance was simply required to Gazette them in order to bring them into operation. 13
The legal issue in SASA and Pioneer Foods
The nub of the dispute in SASA was the scope of the powers of the Minister of Finance upon the receipt of a request from the Minister of Trade and Industry to amend an import duty as provided by section 48(1)(b) of the CEA. 14 Similarly, in Pioneer Foods the court was called upon to decide on the nature of the power conferred upon the Minister of Finance in terms of section 48(1)(b) of the CEA. 15 In essence, section 48(1)(b) of the CEA provides that:
The arguments of the parties in SASA and Pioneer Foods
In SASA the Sugar Association contended that the role of the Minister of Finance in terms of section 48(1)(b) of the CEA resembles that of a "registrar". 17 In the view of the Sugar Association, the power of the Minister of Finance is only to assess a request by the Minister of Trade and Industry for legality. 18 As support for this contention, the Sugar Association proffered that the approach of the Minister of Finance "duplicates the work already done by ITAC and the Minister of Trade and Industry" and this assertion was evinced by the object of the In response, the Minister of Finance contended that he is vested with a full decision making power. 25 Thus, the Minister of Finance argued that he will make a decision only when he is satisfied that the competing interests of economic policies, the fiscus and sugar industry participants have been balanced. 26 Thus the Minister of Finance saw his/her power as constituting more than merely "'rubberstamping"' the decision of the Minister of Trade and Industry.
In the same vein, in Pioneer Foods the applicant argued that if one accorded due consideration to the circumstances under which the Minister of Finance may exercise his/her powers to amend Schedule 1 customs duties in terms of section 48(1)(b) of the CEA, these largely involve situations where s/he is merely required, "mechanistically", and "as a formality" to give effect to the decision of the Minister of Trade and Industry in this regard. 27 Thus it was argued that the role of the Minister of Finance is merely to "rubberstamp decisions taken elsewhere". 28 The applicant also described the Minister of Finance's function in respect of section 48(1)(b) as constituting an "administrative" task which obliged him/her only to "rubberstamp and give effect to the tariffs previously determined by ITAC". 29 33 But the court held that use of the word "otherwise" in section 48(1)(e), supports the interpretation which the court favoured. 34 In the view of the court, the word "otherwise" favoured the conclusion that the power conferred on the Minister of Finance is one which s/he may generally exercise when s/he has come to the conclusion that it is in the "public interest" to do so. 35 The court then held that the CEA is inundated with powers conferred on the Minister of Finance in relation to duties which s/he may exercise when s/he deems it expedient in the public interest to do so. 36 Thus the court held that it is within the confines of the law for the legislature to require approvals by more than one decision maker for the ultimate effectiveness of the proposed action. 37 This is because the court was of the view that the concurrence in the decision making powers between the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Trade and Industry borne out of section 48(1)(b) of the CEA does not detract from this conclusion. 38 The court reasoned that this point is evinced by the provisions of 52 This reading of the decision in Brenco appears not to be correct. This is because the court in Brenco held that one of the issues it had to decide on was:
The nature of the powers and the sequence of decision-making between the Minister of Trade and Industry and the Minister of Finance and hence, the relationship between the powers conferred on each of them. 53 Unfortunately, the court in Brenco did not offer the required guidance or elucidate appropriately on this issue. Suffice it to say that the court held that the role of the Minister of Trade and Industry includes a consideration of policy. 54 Significantly, the court in Brenco held that the Minister of Trade and Industry has no power to amend the terms of the investigating authority's recommendation or to effect such changes, but s/he must refer the matter back to the investigating authority. 55 discretion to amend ITAC's recommendation. Thus, the nature of the power of the Minister of Finance was an issue before the court in Brenco.
Ultimately the court in SASA held that section 48(1) provides that the Minister of Finance "'may amend"': which is language that is directory in nature and thus implies powers which confer an element of discretion on their holders. 56 The court noted that such language is by itself not always decisive, just as language which goes the other way (e.g. must or shall) does not always render a non-compliance as a nullity. 57 Nevertheless, the court held that if the object of the legislation had been to reduce the power of the Minister of Finance, this could easily have been done by appropriate language. The court therefore found that the choice of language evinced a wide discretion on the part of the Minister of Finance in relation to section 48(1)(b) of the CEA. 58 Thus the court held that the provisions of the CEA confer on the Minister of Finance the power to make the final decision, subject only to Parliament, to determine appropriate customs duties. 59
However, on the basis of the court's reasoning that the word "may" is not always decisive, it can be argued that the true purpose of section 48 (1) ultra vires or unlawfully because s/he is assuming powers that were never conferred upon him/her by the legislature.
The reasoning of the court in SASA mirrors the ratio of the court in Pioneer Foods, which held that is clear that when the Minister exercises his/her powers to amend Schedule 1 customs duties under section 48, including import duties of the kind that feature in this matter, s/he must consider what will be in the public interest, and the qualifying word "otherwise", which appears in the relevant phrase in section 48(1)(e) read contextually, does not detract from such an interpretation. 62 The court in Pioneer Foods held that this interpretation of section 48 is informed by a contextual and purposive approach. 63 The court then observed that these powers are postulated in wide, discretionary and permissive (s/he "may"), and not obligatory terms. 64 Read contextually with reference to this matter, the Minister of Finance may amend, but is not compelled to amend customs duties on wheat imports as listed in Part 1 of Schedule 1 when and if s/she deems it "expedient" in the public interest; i.e. when and if s/he considers it necessary in the public interest to do so. 65 It is my submission that the High Court's rejection of the "duplication" argument merits further consideration. Minister of Trade and Industry have a wider mandate on the basis of section 2 of ITAA rather than merely determining the duties. The Minister of Trade and Industry and ITAC are better placed to assess the need for a duty. In fact, it could be argued that it is against the "public interest" to decline a request to impose an import duty that could protect a vulnerable industry. This much is conceded by both courts in SASA and Pioneer Foods. 68 A sensible approach to interpretation must be preferred to one that leads to unreasonable or unbusinesslike results or that hinders the apparent purpose of legislation. 69 The approach to section 48(1)(b) in both SASA and Pioneer Foods caused "unbusinesslike results that undermine[d] the object of import duties", which is to protect local industries and consumers.
The "public interest" principle
At the outset, it is prudent to outline the relevant subsections of section 48 of the CEA, which provide for the "public interest" principle:
(1)(e) The Minister may from time to time by notice in the Gazette amend the General Notes to Schedule No. 1 and Part 1 of the said Schedule or substitute the said Part 1 and amend Part 2 of the said Schedule in so far as it relates to imported goods whenever he deems it expedient in the public interest otherwise to do so.
(2) The Minister may from time to time by like notice amend or withdraw or, if so withdrawn, insert Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5A or Part 5B of Schedule No. 1, whenever he deems it expedient in the public interest to do so: Provided that the Minister may, whenever he deems it expedient in the public interest to do so, reduce any duty specified in the said Parts with retrospective effect from such date and to such extent as may be determined by him in such notice.
(2A)(a)(i) The Minister may from time to time by like notice, whenever he deems it expedient in the public interest to do so, authorize the International Trade Administration Commission or the Commissioner to withdraw, with or without retrospective effect, and subject to such conditions as the said Commission or Commissioner may determine, any duty specified in Part 2 or Part 4 of Schedule No. 1.
(4) The Minister may, whenever he deems it expedient in the public interest to do so, by notice in the Gazette impose an export duty, on such basis as he may determine, in respect of any goods intended for export or any class or kind of such goods or any goods intended for export in circumstances specified in such notice and any export duty so imposed shall be set out in the form of a schedule which shall be deemed to be incorporated in Schedule No. 1 as Part 6 thereof and to constitute an amendment of Schedule No. 1.
(4A)(a) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act contained, the Minister may, whenever he deems it expedient in the public interest to do so,
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Pioneer Foods para 47; SASA para 40.
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Endumeni Municipality para 18. To this end, the court in SASA held that the word "otherwise" in section 48(1)(e) favours the conclusion that the power conferred on the Minister of Finance is one which s/he may generally exercise when s/he has come to the conclusion that it is in the "public interest" that s/he do so. 70 The court then held that the CEA is "replete" with powers conferred on the Minister of Finance in respect of duties which s/he may exercise when s/he deems it "expedient in the public interest to do so". 71 In the same vein, the court in Pioneer Foods held that section 48(1)(b) must always be read in such a manner that it gives effect to the "public interest". 72 Thus the High Court is of the view that section 48(1)(b), when read in the context of section 48, requires that the Minister of Finance must assess whether the request of the Minister of Trade and Industry is in line with the "public interest" principle. This approach, although motivated by a cogent rule of interpretation that a section must be read as a whole, is misconceived. I am of the view that the High Court decisions in SASA and Pioneer Foods misconstrued the "public interest" principle as provided by section 48.
The "public interest" principle in section 48(1)(e) operates as an extraordinary tool through which the Minister of Finance may directly amend the Schedule 1 in exceptional circumstances. Hence the limitation that such a decision must be used when it is "expedient" or "necessary" to do so. Thus the "public interest" principle in section 48 (1) the public interest to do so, the power to impose export duties on his/her own accord. In the same vein, section 48(4A) of the CEA essentially provides that the Minister of Finance is empowered to amend Schedule 1 if it is expedient in the public interest to do so. Thus, all the "public interest" provisions in section 48 are subject to the proviso that they must be used if it is "expedient" to do so.
This invariably posits the question as to the meaning of term "expedient".
The term "expedient" in section 48(1)(e), denotes in the language of the court in Pioneer Foods that such a power must not be used in every instance but rather when it is "necessary". 73 This interpretation of the term "expedient" to mean "necessary" is confirmed by the corresponding provision in the CDA, which provides that the Minister of Finance may act in the public interest only if it is "necessary". 74 It follows, then, that the notion that the section 48 "public interest" enquiry must always be conducted every time the Minister of Finance receives a request from the Minister of Trade and Industry to amend Schedule 1 in terms of section 48(1)(b) contradicts the dictum of the court in Pioneer Foods that such an enquiry must be done only when it is "necessary". Thus the nature of the power conferred on the Minister of Finance in respect of section 48(1)(b) differs materially from the power conferred on the Minister of Finance in respect of the "public interest" provisions in section 48.
Furthermore, it is clear that all the "public interest" provisions in section 48 have no connection to section 48 (1) See s 8(2) of the CDA. The CDA will replace the provisions of the CEA relating to the imposition and collection of import and export duties, at a date to be determined by the President.
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Minister of Finance to impose an anti-dumping duty. 75 Thus the "public interest" provisions are self-standing provisions that confer wide and discretionary powers on the Minister of Finance to directly amend the Schedule 1 of the CEA, but bear no relationship to the power conferred on the Minister of Finance in section 48(1)(b).
It seems plausible, then, that the "public interest" provisions in section 48 must not be read together with section 48(1)(b). In fact, the court in SASA conceded as much when it held that it was prepared to assume, without making a finding on the issue, that the wide power bestowed on the Minister of Finance under section 48 (1) The only way that the "public interest" principle should have been a consideration in both matters should have been through the court's assessing whether the Minister of Finance complied with his/her constitutional obligation to approve the request of the Minister of Trade and Industry only if it is in the "public interest". It is trite law that the "public interest" principle is a basic principle of South African law. This is because it has been held that public functionaries, as organs of the state, have a constitutional duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights, and as bearers of this duty they must perform their functions in the public interest. 79 It follows then that since the Minister of Finance is an organ of state s/he would have been compelled to act in the "public interest" as required by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, the Public Service Act and precedents in this regard. 80 Thus the High Court in both matters should have assessed the "public interest" factor not through the ambit of section 48(1) but through the Constitution and the Public Service Act.
To this end the court in SASA actually attempted the "public interest" enquiry through the avenue of the Constitution, although the court did not complete the enquiry. The court in SASA did not have regard to the provisions of the Public Service Act in line with the principle of constitutional subsidiarity. 81 It was held that the Minister of Finance in this regard is performing a legislative function which requires him/her to perform his/her duties in the interests of the Republic. 82 This is the manifestation of the "public interest" principle.
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Section 10(1) of the CDA. The court then held that the duty to act in the "public interest" arises out of the oaths of office of legislators as well as members of the executive and judicial officers, to be found in Schedule 2 to the Constitution, which requires the office bearer to swear or affirm to be faithful to the Republic. 83 In this regard the legislator acts in a fiduciary capacity which is informed by the principle of rationality in their investigations. 84 This rationality enquiry arises from the requirement that the exercise of a legislative power must have a cogent basis. 85 In essence, rationality requires that the exercise of the legislative power must not be arbitrary and thus demands that there must be a link between the instrument employed by the legislator and the goal sought to be achieved. 86 If there is no such link, the instrument contravenes the rule of law and is invalid. 87 It follows then that the legislator is entitled to conduct the necessary research that enables him/her to fulfil his/her legislative mandate. 88 Consequently, the court in SASA found that there is nothing in the language of the CEA which reduces the role of the Minister of Finance in this regard to that "akin to a registrar". 89 Alternatively, this reasoning of the court in SASA means that not only the Minister of Finance is required to act in the "public interest" but that the Minister of Trade and Industry is also required to do so. This strengthens the argument that the request of the Minister of Trade and Industry does not require the section 48(1) "public interest" enquiry of the Minister of Finance.
It bears mention that the court in Pioneer Foods referred to the power conferred on the Minister of Finance through section 48(1)(e) of the CEA as a "residual power". 90 It is not clear what the court meant by this statement but within the context of the court's reasoning, it is presumed that the court saw the power conferred upon the Minister of Finance in section 48(1)(e) as the final stage in the process of deciding whether to impose a duty after the recommendation of ITAC and the subsequent request of the Minister of Trade and Industry, as provided for by section 48 (1) have argued above, this approach is flawed and lacks a textual basis in the CEA.
The separation of powers issue
The separation of powers issue was significant to the findings of the courts in SASA and Pioneer Foods. The court in SASA held that there is nothing in the language of the CEA that reduces the role of the Minister of Finance to that of a "registrar". 91 The resultant overlap in the decision-making powers of the two Ministers and the fact that investigations are conducted by other organs of state do not detract from its conclusion. 92 There is nothing illegal in the situation that arises when the legislature prescribes, in effect, that approvals by more than one decision maker are required for the efficacy of the action contemplated. 93 Thus, the court held that the principle of the separation of powers requires that the decision makers in the Treasury and the Minister of Finance approach their responsibilities as they deem appropriate as long as the manner in which they do so is rational. 94 Similarly, in Pioneer Foods the court was of the view that in exercising his/her powers the Minister of Finance is invariably conducting a policy exercise, in which s/he will have to accord due consideration to a number of issues, including fiscal and economic matters. 95 This much is further apparent if one has regard to the nature of the assessments conducted by the various components of the National Treasury and the South African Revenue Services and associated departments, before the Minister of Finance ultimately decides whether or not to promulgate the amended duties. 96 As such, the Minister of Finance is not merely a "rubberstamp functionary". 97 Consequently the court in Pioneer Foods held that this means that when exercising powers under section 48 (1) Secondly, given that the Minister of Finance exercises a policy choice which lies within his/her terrain, it is not up to a court to second-guess her/him, nor should a court interfere with the process, save in obvious cases when irreversible harm would occur and it is constitutionally appropriate to grant the order concerned. 101 This reasoning is in line with the precedents in this regard. 102 Thus, the court held that the power contemplated in terms of section 48(1)(b), similarly constitutes a power which lies in the terrain of the executive authority of the Minister of Finance, and especially in instances whereby the exercise of such power is underway, it should not be interfered with by way of a mandatory order, save in the clearest of cases, and only where irreversible harm might occur should such an order not be granted. 103 The court was of the view that neither of these considerations were proved in this matter, and to have granted an order in the terms sought by the applicant would therefore have unjustifiably contravened the principle of the separation of powers. 104 Thus the court in Pioneer Foods held that it is evident that a request by the Minister of Trade and Industry for an amendment to the import duties on wheat does not result in an automatic acceptance and amendment by the Minister of Finance and it does not necessarily follow that a request by the Minister of Trade and Industry will necessarily be approved by the Minister of Finance. 105
The powers of the Minister of Finance in the CDA regime
As noted earlier, the CEA, which is the legislation upon which the SASA and Pioneer Foods were based, will eventually be replaced by the CDA in respect of the imposition and collection of import and export duties, at a date to be determined by the President. A peek at the CDA in this regard reveals seeks to "foster local economic activity". 108 On the one hand, the ground of "fostering local economic activity" is too wide, ambiguous and problematic because it could allow the Minister of Trade and Industry to intrude on the terrain of ITAC by requesting an amendment to counteract, for instance, the "dumping" of a product or to "safeguard" local industry. Such an approach would be in conflict with the ITAA and indeed the CDA, which confer upon ITAC the exclusive power to investigate and evaluate the need for a customs duty, anti-dumping and safeguard duties. 109 This reasoning was endorsed by the court in SCAW, which held that ITAC has the power to investigate, evaluate and make recommendations to the Minister of Trade and Industry on the imposition, amendment or removal of customs, antidumping and countervailing duties. 110 On the other hand, it is unclear which grounds would justify ITAC's requesting an amendment on the basis that it is "implementing measures to foster local economic activity". ITAC is a specialist investigative body and should not be given wide and non-specific powers to implement policy measures that promote "'economic activity"' lest it intrude on the policy space of 
